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A fundamental question faced by policymakers is how best to help individuals who are in financial 
trouble.  This paper examines the consequences of the most basic approach: giving people large cash 
transfers.  To determine whether this prevents or merely postpones bankruptcy, we exploit a unique 
dataset  of  Florida  Lottery  winners  linked  to  bankruptcy  records.    Results  show  that  although 
recipients of $50,000 to $150,000 are 50 percent less likely to file for bankruptcy in the two years 
after  winning  relative  to  small  winners,  they  are  equally  more  likely  to  file  three  to  five  years 
afterward.  Furthermore, bankruptcy records indicate that even though the median winner of a large 
cash prize could have paid off all of his unsecured debt or increased equity in new or existing assets, 
he chose not to do either.  Consequently, our results suggest that some skepticism regarding the 
long-term effect of cash transfers may be warranted.  In addition, our findings are more consistent 
with the strategic model of bankruptcy than the negative shock model, though we note we cannot 
rule out the importance of behavioral issues such as high discount rates.   
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1.  Introduction 
 During economic downturns, an important question governments face is whether and how 
to help individuals who are struggling financially.  The central issue in determining the appropriate 
policy is whether the assistance will have a permanent impact or will merely postpone financial 
distress.  The goal of this paper is to determine whether the simplest solution to helping indebted 
individuals—giving  them  cash—enhances  longer-term  financial  stability  and  helps  them  avoid 
bankruptcy.    In doing so, this paper also offers insight into the long-running debate about whether 
bankruptcy is caused by moral hazard or by negative shocks (Fay, Hurst, and White, 2002).   
While it might seem unambiguous that cash transfers that are large relative to debt should 
prevent bankruptcy, there are reasons to be doubtful.  For example, individuals may simply have 
high discount rates that lead them to consume the resources in the short run.
1  Individuals may also 
engage in mental accounting (Thaler, 1990), treat the cash as “house money” and use it to take on 
additional risks (Thaler and Johnson, 1990), make consumption commitments that make it more 
difficult  to  overcome  future  negative  income  shocks  (Chetty  and  Szeidl,  2007;  Zhu,  2008),  or 
develop  a  taste  for  luxury  goods  that  outlasts  the  money.    Finally,  individuals  may  lack  the 
knowledge to handle large amounts of cash wisely; surveys have consistently shown that U.S. adults 
have relatively low levels of financial literacy (e.g., Higert, Hogarth, and Beverly, 2003; Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2007).  The perceived importance of these considerations has been partly responsible for 
the shift in the legal field from lump-sum payments to structured settlements,
2 a trend that Pryor 
                                                           
1 This behavior could be rational or it could be at odds with the long-run selves’ preference against spending in the short 
run.  For more on the latter, see DellaVigna (forthcoming); Frederick et. al (2002); and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).   
2 This concern is reflected by the words of Judge Joseph Weiss of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, who stated that “Lump-sum payments all too often are improvidently invested or squandered by unsophisticated 
recipients and so fail to provide for the lifetime of medical bills and unemployment faced by victims of serious injury."  
Judge Weiss also calls the reliance on lump sum awards one of the “enduring weaknesses of the common law tort 
system” (Jacquette v. Continental, 1999).     2
(2002) states is “perhaps the most striking development in the tort payment structure over the last 
25 years.”  However, to our knowledge the only research on the general question of whether large 
cash  transfers  improve  the  longer  term  financial  outcomes  of  struggling  individuals  consists  of 
informal surveys of lump-sum settlement recipients.    
This study also contributes to the debate on whether personal bankruptcy is primarily caused 
by strategic behavior or by negative shocks (e.g., Fay et al., 2002; Himmelstein, Thorne, Warren, and 
Woolhandler, 2009; White, 2006).  Since recipients of large cash transfers have the option of filing 
bankruptcy  later  on,  indebted  recipients  may  strategically  consume  all  of  the  transfer  in  the 
expectation  that  they  will  later  file  for  bankruptcy  anyway.    Consequently,  to  the  extent  that 
receiving transfers large enough to pay off all unsecured debts does not reduce bankruptcy rates 
over the longer term, it suggests support for the moral hazard model of bankruptcy rather than the 
negative shock model.   
To answer these questions, we apply a straightforward research design to a unique dataset.  
Specifically, we link winners of the Florida Lottery to bankruptcy records and compare recipients of 
$50,000 to $150,000 to those who won less than $10,000.  By exploiting the randomness of the 
lottery, we can distinguish the effect of cash transfers from confounding factors typically associated 
with receipt of such awards.  We rely on the identifying assumption that conditional on winning for 
the  first  time,  the  amount  won  is  uncorrelated  with  the  recipients’  underlying  propensity  for 
bankruptcy.    Tests  support  this  assumption:  we  find  no  difference  in  either  the  demographic 
characteristics or the bankruptcy rates of large winners versus small winners in the years prior to 
winning the lottery.   
The results indicate that giving $50,000 to $150,000 to people only postpones bankruptcy.  
Specifically, while these recipients are 50 percent less likely than small winners to file for bankruptcy   3
immediately after winning, they are equally more likely to file for bankruptcy three to five years after 
winning.  Furthermore, bankruptcy petitions filed in the 5 years after winning reveal that the net 
assets and unsecured debt of large winners are no different from those of small winners.  This 
implies that even though the median winner of a large cash prize could have paid off all of his 
unsecured debt or increased equity in new or existing assets, he did neither.  Bankruptcy records also 
yield  little  evidence  that  large  winners  later  filed  for  bankruptcy  due  to  increased  housing 
consumption commitments or in order to game the unlimited homestead exemption in Florida 
bankruptcy  law,  suggesting  that  the  recipients  consumed  their  winnings.    Since  large  winners 
experienced no more negative shocks than the small winners due to the randomness of the prize 
magnitude, we interpret out findings as more consistent with the strategic model of bankruptcy than 
the negative-shock model.  In addition, our results indicate that policymakers should be cautious in 
offering cash assistance to heavily indebted individuals with the hope of increasing their longer-term 
financial security.   
2.  Data 
Data on lottery winners were obtained from the Florida Lottery.  The data include every 
winner of the Fantasy 5 lottery game in Florida from April 29, 1993 through November 27, 2002.  
These winners represent all individuals who won more than $600, the minimum amount for which 
Federal Law mandates that records be kept and reported to the Internal Revenue Service.  For each 
lottery winner, we observe the individual’s name and home zip code, the amount won (which we 
adjust for inflation), and the date of the drawing.   
Because we ultimately link bankruptcy records to winners using their first and last names and 
county of residence, we attempt to identify the set of unique names so as to minimize the number of 
individuals falsely linked to bankruptcy.  Toward that end, we exclude all names that appeared more   4
than once in 2008 phone records for that county.  In addition, if lottery records indicated that an 
individual with a unique name from a given county won more than once, we then use only the first 
time that individual won.
3  We do this because while the largest amount an individual won over this 
time  period  would  undoubtedly  be  correlated  with  her  financial  condition  (e.g.,  low-income 
individuals may play more and thus win more  large prizes over time), the amount won the first time 
should be random.  We also limit the sample to individuals who won less than $150,000 since only 
153 Fantasy 5 winners won more than that during this time period.  As shown in Table 1, this limits 
the sample to 34,987 individuals.  While these amounts represent pre-tax winnings, the Internal 
Revenue Service requires that the Florida Lottery withhold 25 percent of amounts greater than 
$5,000.   
  Bankruptcy  records  were  obtained  from  the  Public  Access  to  Court  Electronic  Records 
database (PACER) maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.    In total, there 
were 1,433,243 personal bankruptcy records filed in Florida from 1985 to November 27, 2007.  
These records represent all of the Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 personal bankruptcy petitions filed in 
the three district U.S. bankruptcy courts in  Florida.  While we note that not all petitions were 
approved  by  bankruptcy  judges,  for  ease  of  exposition  we  will  subsequently  refer  to  winners’ 
bankruptcy rates rather than the more cumbersome “bankruptcy filing rates”.   
Included in the data are the first and last name of the filer along with his or her residential 
address, the date filed, and the chapter under which the bankruptcy case was filed.  In addition, we 
also obtained more detailed data from bankruptcies filed between January 1, 2004 and November 
27, 2007 since this information was available electronically.  These data are discussed in more detail 
in Section 6.   
                                                           
3 Results are unchanged when these individuals are excluded from the analysis.     5
  Bankruptcy  represents  an  important  outcome  for  several  reasons.    First,  filing  for 
bankruptcy  is  arguably  the  most  extreme  signal  of  financial  distress.    In  addition,  preventing 
bankruptcy may be socially desirable both because it is bad for creditors and because by affecting a 
filer’s credit score, it can affect the availability and price of future consumer loans as well as her 
employment prospects.   
  The lottery winners were linked to bankruptcy filings on the basis of first and last name and 
county of residence, with results shown in Table 2.  Each winner was linked to any bankruptcy case 
filed up to five years prior to winning the lottery and within five years after winning the lottery.  In 
all, 1,934 Fantasy 5 winners were linked to a bankruptcy in the five years after winning.  This match 
implies a one-year bankruptcy rate among lottery players of just over 1 percent, which is similar to 
the filing rate of 1.0 percent for all adults in Florida from 1993 through 2001.
4   
  While it is possible that type I or type II errors were made in linking lottery winners to 
bankruptcy  records,  neither  type  of  error  should  invalidate  the  research  design.    Due  to  the 
randomness with which amount won is determined, we should be no more or less likely to match 
winners of large sums than winners of small sums except for the causal effect of amount received on 
bankruptcy rates.  
3.  Fantasy 5 and Identification Strategy 
To  identify  the  effect  of  large  cash  transfers  on  bankruptcy  rates,  we  compare  the 
bankruptcy rates of large cash prize recipients to those of small prize recipients.  This strategy is 
similar to those employed in other papers to examine the effect of income shocks on health and 
mortality (Lindahl, 2005) and on labor earnings, savings, and consumption (Imbens et al., 2001).  
                                                           
4 Source: U.S. Census and authors’ calculations.     6
The identifying assumption in our analysis is that conditional on winning at least $600 in Fantasy 5 
for the first time, the amount won is uncorrelated with underlying propensity for bankruptcy.  We 
emphasize that we focus only on the first time an individual is observed to win rather than assuming 
whether or not an individual ever wins a large prize (conditional on winning $600 or more at least 
once) is random, given that the latter would clearly depend on frequency of play.   
In order to gauge the validity of our identifying assumption, some background regarding the 
Fantasy 5 game is necessary.  Fantasy 5 is a pari-mutuel lottery game in which amount won depends 
on how many numbers were matched, how many winning tickets were sold, and how many people 
played.  The largest prizes were given for matching five of five numbers and ranged from less than 
$10,000 to more than $200,000.  The amount won depended not only on the number of winning 
tickets and total plays but also on the structure of the game.  From April 29, 1993 through July 15, 
2001, individuals who matched five of five numbers won an average of $20,000, though depending 
on the number of winners the amount varied from $1,300 to $132,000.  Beginning on July 16, 2001 
the game changed such that the average amount won for matching 5 numbers increased to $120,000.  
On days in which no one matched five of five numbers, people who matched 4 numbers won an 
average of $900.  Consequently, because the number of small and large winners changed over time, 
it is important for our main analysis to control for that as well as for year fixed effects.  Finally, while 
it is possible for individuals to play up to ten times on each card, no lottery winners in the data 
played the same 5 numbers multiple times.  This implies that although some people are more likely 
to enter our data than others (i.e., those who play the lottery more frequently or play more numbers 
on a card), conditional on winning $600 the amount won is unaffected by the number of plays paid 
for on a given card.     7
An important advantage of this identification strategy is that it can be empirically tested in 
two ways.  First, in results available upon request, we show that amount won is not explained by 
winners’ neighborhood characteristics.  Second, and more importantly, we show that recipients of 
large  cash  prizes  were  no  more  or  less  likely  to  file  for  bankruptcy  before  they  won  than  were 
recipients of small cash prizes.  This implies that except for the difference in amount won, we would 
not expect bankruptcy rates to differ systematically after winning the lottery either.  Collectively 
these tests suggest that any difference between the post-winning bankruptcy rates of large winners 
and small winners is properly interpreted as the causal effect of the lottery winnings.   In addition, in 
Section 5.3 we report similar findings when we restrict the sample to those who won after the game 
changed in 2001 and compare players who matched 5 numbers and won an average of $80,000 to 
players who matched 4 numbers and won just over $1,000.    
In assessing the external validity of our estimates, it is important to point out that lottery 
players are much more representative of the population than some might think.  For example, 
Kearney (2005) reports that over half of the adults in the U.S. have played the lottery in the last year.  
Even more importantly, annual spending (i.e., frequency of play) is also approximately equal across 
the income distribution, though college-educated individuals play approximately 40 percent less than 
high school graduates (Kearney, 2005).  In addition, in results available from the authors we find 
that our results are unchanged when we exclude individuals who won multiple times over the time 
period  examined.    This  indicates  that  the  results  are  not  driven  by  individuals  who  play  most 
frequently.  Consequently, while we are unaware of any surveys that ask about both lottery-playing 
behavior and other characteristics that might be targeted by government bailouts such as subprime, 
adjustable rate, or Alt-A mortgages, we would expect there to be considerable overlap between these 
populations.  As a result, while our study may be less helpful in predicting the impact of a cash 
transfer to highly educated people not near the bankruptcy margin—though for the sake of science   8
we would be happy to participate in that field experiment—we do think it is informative regarding 
the likely effect of bailouts to people in financial trouble.   
4.  Methodology 
Given the intuitive research design, the simplest way to determine the effect of receiving 
large  cash  transfers  is  to  compare  large  prize  winners  to  small  prize  winners.    In  addition  to 
comparing the bankruptcy rates of these groups graphically before and after winning the lottery, we 
also do so using ordinary least squares regression, though results are similar when estimating a 
probit.
5  Specifically, we estimate:   
Bankruptcyi = αi + β0 (After Change in Game Structure)i  + β1 ($10,000 ≤ Amount < $50,000)i  
+ β2 ($50,000 ≤ Amount< $150,000)i + εi 
where Bankruptcyi is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i filed for bankruptcy within a given 
number of years after winning, αi is a set of fixed effects for the year in which the individual won, 
(After Change in Game Structure)i is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual won after the 
structure  of  the  game  was  changed  on  July  16,  2001,  and  the  remaining  variables  are  dummy 
variables for various ranges of amounts won where the excluded group is less than $10,000.  While 
one may object that winning $10,000 may have its own effect on bankruptcy rates, we choose that as 
the cutoff because prior to July 16, 2001 there were relatively few winners of less than $3,000.  
However, in Section 5.3 we show that the results are robust to using smaller cash prizes as the 
omitted group.   
                                                           
5 Although probit or logit estimations can be preferable to ordinary least squares when most values are near zero or one, 
there are also disadvantages that one might expect to be especially worrisome in this context.  For example, omitted 
variables can cause bias in probit or logit estimations even if they are orthogonal to the treatment variable.  In addition, 
even classical measurement error in the dependent variable can result in inconsistent estimates (Hausman, 2001; 
Hausman et al, 1998).        9
Finally, for ease of exposition, we will hereafter refer to recipients of less than $10,000 as 
“small winners,” winners of $10,000 to $50,000 as “medium winners,” and winners of $50,000 to 
$150,000 as “large winners.”  
5.  Results 
5.1  Tests of the Identification Strategy 
To demonstrate that the size of the income shock is random and thus uncorrelated with 
underlying  financial  well-being,  we  provide  two  tests.    First,  we  check  whether  amount  won  is 
explained by the winners’ neighborhood characteristics.  Specifically, we regress amount won on 13 
variables measuring zip code income, race gender, marital status, and educational attainment, and 
find that only one is significant at the 5% level.
6  More importantly, all 13 variables explain only 
0.1% of the total variation in amount won.    
Second, we examine the extent to which filing for bankruptcy prior to winning the lottery is 
predicted  by  the  amount  later  won.    So  long  as  the  amount  won  is  uncorrelated  with  one’s 
underlying propensity to file for bankruptcy, there should be no difference between the bankruptcy 
rates of individuals who later win large or small cash prizes.   
  This is shown graphically in Figure 1a, which plots flows into bankruptcy before and after 
winning for both small and large winners.  While the pre-winning bankruptcy rates of medium and 
large winners appear lower than those of small winners, this could be due to change in the game in 
2001  that  shifted  the  relative  number  of  large  versus  small  winners.    To  the  extent  that 
macroeconomic determinants of bankruptcy also varied over time, small winners could on average 
                                                           
6 That variable is median household income, the coefficient of which implies that a $10,000 increase in neighborhood 
income is associated with a prize that is $400 smaller, which is quite small relative to the prize examined in this paper.     10 
be more or less exposed to those forces than large winners.  To determine if this is the case, in 
Figure 1b we graph residual bankruptcy rates after partialing out year fixed effects.  The results show 
that this eliminates the pre-winning rate differences.   
  This  is  confirmed  more  formally  in  Table  3.    Although  the  unconditional  means  in 
specification 1 suggest that medium and large winners were less likely to file for bankruptcy than 
small winners before winning, this difference is dramatically diminished and is no longer statistically 
significant once one controls for either the change in game structure (specification (2)), year fixed 
effects (specification 3), or both (specification 4).  This indicates that once one accounts for the fact 
that large and small winners were on average exposed to different macroeconomic forces due to the 
change in the game, there is little correlation between the size of the cash prize and one’s underlying 
propensity to file for bankruptcy.    
Figure 1b: Flows into Bankruptcy Before and After Winning the Lottery (After Removing Year 
Fixed Effects) 
   11 
5.2  The Effect of Lottery Winnings on Bankruptcy Rates 
We now turn to estimating the impact of receiving large cash prizes on future bankruptcy 
rates.  Figures 1a and 1b show the flows into bankruptcy for large and small winners after winning 
the lottery and indicate that large winners are much less likely to file for bankruptcy in the two years 
after winning.  This pattern reverses from years three through five, however, during which time large 
winners are more likely to file for bankruptcy than are small winners.     
To investigate this pattern more rigorously, we estimate the impact of winning large lump 
sums on bankruptcy rates within two years, from three to five years, and within five years after 
winning.  Results are shown in Table 4, where specification 1 shows unconditional differences, 
specification 2 controls for the change in the game structure, specification 3 controls for year fixed 
effects, and specification 4 controls for both the change in the game structure and year fixed effects.  
Consistent with Figures 1a and 1b, we find statistically significant decreases in bankruptcy rates in 
the two years after winning, a result that is robust across all of the specifications.  Our preferred 
specification in specification 4 shows that the bankruptcy rates of medium and large winners fall 
0.87 and 1.63 percentage points in the first two years, which represent relative declines of 27 and 50 
percent.  These declines are offset, however, by increases of 0.5 and 1.21 percentage points three to 
five years after winning, respectively, although the increase is only statistically significant for large 
winners.  The net result is that within five years after winning, medium and large winners are no 
more or less likely to file for bankruptcy than are small winners.  This is true despite the fact that the 
median large winner won a cash prize ($65,000) that was sufficient to pay off all of the unsecured 
debt owed by the most financially distressed lottery players ($49,000) at the time of winning.
7   
                                                           
7 This figure comes from the bankruptcy filings of lottery players who filed for bankruptcy in the year prior to winning 
the lottery.  These data are discussed in more depth in Section 6.     12 
In order to show that this pattern is not driven by the admittedly arbitrary definitions of 
small, medium, and large winners, we also show how bankruptcy rates over these time periods vary 
across  the  full  distribution  of  earnings.    Figures  2,  3,  and  4  show  the  bankruptcy  rates  of  all 
individuals within two years, from three to five years, and within five years of winning the lottery.    
The graphical evidence is consistent with the results in Table 4: Figure 2 shows that the likelihood of 
filing for bankruptcy within the first two years after winning is smaller for winners of large cash 
prizes while Figure 3 shows that this trend reverses three to five years after winning.  Finally, Figure 
4 shows there is little evidence that winning larger cash prizes affects overall bankruptcy rates in the 
five years after winning.   
5.3  Robustness of the Results 
We investigate the robustness of these results in several ways.  First, while we defined the 
omitted group as amounts less than $10,000 in order to ensure reasonable numbers of small and 
large winners in each year, one might be concerned that winning up to $10,000 has its own effect on 
bankruptcy rates.  Consequently, we examine whether the effect is different when estimated relative 
to  winning  less  than  $2,500.    Results  are  shown  in  specification  2  of  Table  5,  where  the  first 
specification serves as a reference by showing the preferred result from specification 4 of Table 4.  
Results show similar declines in bankruptcy rates for medium and large winners in the two years 
after winning and statistically significant increases in bankruptcy rates for medium and large winners 
three to five years after winning.  In addition, in order to define the control group even more 
conservatively, in specification 3 of Table 5 we include winners from Florida Lotto
8 and control for 
                                                           
8 Florida Lotto is similar to Fantasy 5 except that individuals can match up to 6 numbers and win a maximum prize of 
several million dollars.  We use data on individuals who matched 5 of 6 numbers and thus won between $600 and 
$20,000.     13 
game fixed effects and find similar results when comparing large winners to those who received less 
than $1,000.   
To further test the validity of our identification strategy we allow for the possibility that the 
pool of players in a given drawing may change depending on the size of the pot and the size of the 
largest prize won in the previous drawing.  To the extent that these changes are correlated with 
expected prize size, estimates could be biased.  Consequently, we include controls for both the total 
amount paid out in the previous drawing
9 and the maximum prize won in the previous drawing 
(specification 4) as well as the total amount paid out in the current drawing (specification 5).  Results 
in Table 5 and indicate that these controls make little difference.   
Perhaps a more worrisome possibility is that while the total number of players (and thus 
prize pot) is exogenous, the number of individuals who match all 5 numbers on a given day is not.  
For example, one might be worried that certain individuals play “more random” numbers than 
others and thus win more, conditional on matching all 5 numbers.  While we showed earlier that this 
was unlikely since large and small winners come from the same neighborhoods and did not file for 
bankruptcy at different rates prior to winning, here we offer an additional test.  After the game 
structure changed on July 16, 2001, the prize size was determined largely by whether the individual 
matched 5 of 5 numbers or matched 4 of 5 numbers when no one else matched all 5.  Individuals 
who matched 5 numbers won an average of $80,000, while those who matched 4 numbers during 
this time period won just over $1,000.  Consequently, we instrument for being a large winner using 
an indicator for whether the individual matched 5 of 5 numbers.   
                                                           
9 This excludes amounts less than $600, which we do not observe.     14 
Results are shown in specification 6 of Table 5 and show that large winners (as proxied by 
having matched 5 of 5 numbers) are 1.2 percentage points less likely to file for bankruptcy in the 
first  two  years  (p=0.081)  but  are  1.9  percentage  points  more  likely  to  file  three  to  five  years 
afterward  (p=0.058).    Given  whether  an  individual  matches  5  rather  than  4  numbers  is  purely 
random, we interpret this as compelling evidence in support of our identification strategy.   
Finally, we examine whether differential exposure of large and small winners to bankruptcy 
reform is driving the results.  The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA) was signed on April 20, 2005 and went into effect on October 17, 2005.  In anticipation 
of the change, bankruptcy filings increased beginning in March of 2005 and peaked in October 
before the law went into effect.  While we would expect that year fixed effects would control for 
much  of  the  effect  of  bankruptcy  reform,  we also  construct  two  control  variables  that  capture 
exposure to these effects more precisely.  The first measures the number of months during the time 
period in question in which the individual faced a greater incentive to file for bankruptcy given the 
expectation that BAPCPA would take effect.  The second control variable measures the number of 
months during the time period in question in which the lottery winner faced a reduced probability of 
filing for bankruptcy due to the tougher bankruptcy laws.  For example, an individual who won on 
June 1 of 2001 was exposed to all 7.5 months (from March 1 of 2005 through October 16, 2005) in 
which consumers expected a tougher bankruptcy law in the future and 7.5 months facing the new 
bankruptcy law (from October 17, 2005 when the new law went into effect through May 31, 2006, 
exactly five years after winning). 
Results are shown in the specification 7 of Table 5 and are consistent with the findings 
reported earlier.  Together with results from specifications 2 through 6, this implies that the results 
are unaffected by the choice of control group, the current or previous drawing’s prize pool, the   15 
previous drawing’s maximum prize won, or bankruptcy reform.  In addition, the results are robust to 
comparing  the  subset  of  large  and  small  winners  for  whom  the  variation  in  winnings  is 
unquestionably random.  In addition, in results available upon request we find that similar estimates 
result  when  estimating  the  effect  of  the  cash  transfers  using  a  probit  instead  of  ordinary  least 
squares.
10   
5.4  Attrition 
As noted earlier, individuals were linked to bankruptcy based on first and last name as well 
as county of residence.  Given this approach, attrition will cause a problem for identification under 
two conditions: 1) the amount won is correlated with propensity to move out of the county, and 2) 
some  of  the  individuals  who  moved  out  of  the  county  on  the  basis  of  amount  won  filed  for 
bankruptcy in the next five years.  In other words, if migration is orthogonal to amount won, then 
there will be no bias.  Similarly, if none of the individuals who move out of the county file for 
bankruptcy, then there is no error in who is ultimately matched to a bankruptcy.   
Migration is perhaps less likely to be an issue in Florida than in other states for two reasons.  
First,  counties  in  Florida  represent  relatively  large  geographic  areas.    For  example,  the  average 
county in Florida (by population) is 1,866 square miles, or more than six times the size of New York 
City.
11 In addition, Florida is a net in-migration state over this time period.  Consequently, one might 
expect that exiting the county after winning $50,000 to $150,000 would be less likely in Florida than 
it would be in other states. 
                                                           
10 Specifically, marginal effects from probit estimations indicate that large winners are 1.3 percentage points (p=0.000) 
less likely to file within 2 years of winning and are 1.16 percentage points (p=0.117) more likely to file 3 to 5 years 
afterward.    
11 Sources: www.fl-counties.com and www.census.gov/popest.   16 
We can offer an empirical test of whether receiving large amounts of cash causes people to 
leave the county.  Specifically, we examine whether the amount won is correlated with the likelihood 
that the individual will be found in the 2008 phone book 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 years after winning.  
While this is an imperfect test due to the fact that some households no longer have landlines, some 
individuals in a household with a landline are not listed in the phone book, and winning the lottery 
could potentially enable individuals to afford a landline, the exercise is instructive nonetheless.  One 
might especially be concerned if large winners were much less likely to show up in the phone book 
in the first two years after winning the lottery, but then were much more likely to show up in the 
phonebook three to five years after winning.  In that case, one might worry that the results were 
being driven by selective migration out of the county.   
The results from this exercise (available upon request) show no evidence of such a pattern.  
Specifically, we find that large winners were a statistically insignificant 3.0 percentage points more 
likely  to  show  up  in  the  phone  book  within  two  years  of  winning  the  lottery  relative  to  small 
winners, of whom 30.4 percent were listed in the county phone book.  The difference in years three 
through five is a similarly insignificant 3.1 percentage points.  Collectively, this provides suggestive 
evidence that the pattern seen in bankruptcy rates is not driven by selective migration out of the 
county.   
6.  Discussion 
There are several potential explanations of the result that in the aggregate, receiving large 
financial  windfalls  only  delays  bankruptcy  rather  than  prevents  it.    Perhaps  the  simplest 
interpretation is that bankruptcy is postponed at the individual level.  For example, while indebted 
individuals may use financial windfalls to continue to make payments to creditors and/or increase 
their consumption in the near term, they may not pay down debt sufficiently to avoid bankruptcy in   17 
the  longer  term.    This  could  occur  if  individuals  have  high  discount  rates,  engage  in  mental 
accounting, or struggle with financial literacy.  Alternatively, recipients of large cash windfalls may 
find it optimal to game the bankruptcy system by consuming or protecting their windfall in the 
expectation that they will later file for bankruptcy anyway.  In fact, Florida bankruptcy law allows for 
an unlimited homestead exemption, which provides an incentive for individuals to increase their 
equity in real estate as a way of protecting their winnings from creditors in bankruptcy court.   
A different interpretation of the results is that receiving large cash windfalls does not delay 
bankruptcy at the individual level.  Instead, it may be that some individuals use their winnings to 
avoid bankruptcy while others make consumption commitments with their cash such as buying a 
house.  In the years afterward, a fraction of those winners will be subjected to a negative income 
shock that would not have pushed them into bankruptcy had they not bought a house (Zhu, 2008).   
To help distinguish between these interpretations and to address whether large winners who 
subsequently file for bankruptcy have less debt than small winners, we acquired data on cases filed 
after  2004,  the  year  at  which  details  of  bankruptcy  filings  became  available  electronically.  
Specifically, we retrieved data for a random sample of people who won less than $1,500 and 1) filed 
in the 5 years prior to winning, or 2) filed zero to two years after winning, or 3) filed three to five 
years after winning.  In addition, we retrieved and coded data from the case filings of all recipients of 
more than $25,000 who filed after 2004 and for whom the filing was up to five years before winning, 
zero to two years after winning, or three to five years after winning.  We emphasize that many of 
these lottery winners were not in our original dataset since we could only acquire detailed data for 
cases filed after 2004. 
The descriptive statistics for this sample of filers are shown in Table 6 and show the levels of 
debt,  assets,  income,  expenditures  and  real  estate  averaged  over  all  individuals  in  each  group,   18 
including those who reported zeros.  Panel A shows that there is no economically or statistically 
significant  difference  between  the assets,  debts,  income,  and  expenditures  of  larger  and  smaller 
winners who filed for bankruptcy before winning the lottery.  While larger winners were somewhat 
more likely to be homeowners than smaller winners (75% vs. 56%), despite that difference larger 
winners as a group owned slightly less property and had less equity in that property.  None of the 
differences are statistically significant at conventional levels, which is consistent with the falsification 
exercises in Table 3 and provides further support for the identifying assumption.   
Panel B shows the characteristics of individuals who filed for bankruptcy within 2 years after 
winning.  Figures there show evidence consistent with multiple interpretations.  Larger winners who 
did not avoid bankruptcy in the near term were those who had the highest level of debt.  This 
suggests that in the short term, large cash windfalls do reduce bankruptcy filings by those with the 
least to gain from filing.  However, large winners who file in the near term also have significantly 
higher  housing  commitments;  seventy-four  percent  owned  their  homes  compared  to  fifty-two 
percent of small winners who filed.   
Panel C shows the characteristics of individuals who filed 3 to 5 years after winning the 
lottery and provides some evidence on whether the increase in the rate 3 to 5 years later is due to 
consumption commitments.  If such commitments were responsible, then one might expect large 
winners who filed during this time to be more likely to be homeowners and to live in more valuable 
homes.  However, we find no evidence that this is the case.
12    
                                                           
12 In checking the sensitivity of the figures in Table 6 to outliers, we found one larger winner who filed 3 to 5 years 
afterward and who reported living in a house worth over $1 million.  Consequently, we excluded this individual when 
calculating the average real estate market value and equity in Panels C and D in Table 6.  Including this individual 
changes average equity and market value to $27,810 and $92,023 in Panel C and to $24,940 and $109,152 in Panel D.     19 
Panel D shows the characteristics of winners who filed at some point within 5 years after 
winning.  There, it is striking that the net assets of recipients of $25,000 to $150,000 were only 
$8,000 higher than those of people who won less than $1,500.  Furthermore, small winners who 
filed reported having unsecured debt of $58,438 while large winners reported a similar amount of 
$51,993.  We also find that although large winners live in somewhat more expensive houses than 
small winners, they are no more likely to own a home and have no more equity in their homes than 
small winners.  This suggests that larger winners are not gaming the homestead exemption in Florida 
bankruptcy law.  While this may surprise some economists, it did not surprise bankruptcy lawyers 
with  whom  we  spoke
13  and  is  consistent  with  other  evidence  more  supportive  of  a  notion  of 
bounded rationality among lottery players (Guryan and Kearney, 2008).   
In short, we find little evidence that the increase in the bankruptcy rates of large winners 
three to five years after winning is due to consumption commitments.  The data also provide no 
support for the interpretation that large winners game the bankruptcy system by taking advantage of 
Florida’s unlimited homestead exemption in bankruptcy since there is no difference in the real estate 
equity of large and small winners who subsequently file for bankruptcy.  However, we are ultimately 
unable to distinguish whether large winners delay rather than prevent filing for bankruptcy due to 
impatience (rational or otherwise) or some other reason.   
Finally, we find that the net assets of recipients of $25,000 to $150,000 are no different from 
those who received less than $1,500.  This suggests that whatever the recipients did with their cash, 
they did not use it to either pay down debt or increase their assets.  This result is roughly consistent 
with that of Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007) who find that although consumers initially used 
                                                           
13 One in particular commented that this type of behavior is so unlikely that “only economists would be concerned 
about that.”   20 
federal rebate checks to reduce debt, eventually debt levels returned to their pre-rebate levels.  The 
fact that the same appears to be true even when consumers receive vastly larger cash transfers is, 
however, striking.   
7.  Conclusion 
   We investigate the extent to which receiving large lump sums of cash affect bankruptcy in 
the short- and long-term.  To distinguish the effect of the transfer from other confounding factors, 
we  compare  lottery  players  who  won  between  $10,000  and  $50,000  or  between  $50,000  and 
$150,000 to those who won less than $10,000.  Consistent with the identifying assumption that the 
magnitude of the prize won is randomly assigned conditional on winning, we find no statistical 
difference between these groups’ bankruptcy rates prior to winning or in the assets, debts, incomes, 
or expenditures of those winners who did file prior to winning the lottery.   
The results indicate that while the lump-sum payments reduce the probability of bankruptcy 
in the first two years after winning in an economically and statistically significant way, this reduction 
is followed by statistically significant increases of similar magnitude three to five years after winning.  
Furthermore, a deeper examination of the bankruptcy filings shows that not only are the rates of 
bankruptcy  not  different  overall,  but  recipients  of  $25,000  to  $150,000  who  later  filed  for 
bankruptcy did so with similar levels of net assets and unsecured debt.  Bankruptcy records also 
reveal little evidence that large winners filed for bankruptcy due to increased housing consumption 
commitments or in order to game the unlimited homestead exemption in Florida bankruptcy law.  
This indicates that receiving cash transfers that are sufficiently large to pay off all of one’s unsecured 
debt only enables individuals to postpone rather than prevent bankruptcy.   
These results are broadly consistent with the strategic or opportunistic model of bankruptcy 
rather than the negative-shock model, though we note that we are unable to distinguish between   21 
opportunism and other behavioral issues such as high discount rates.  In addition, our findings 
suggest that some skepticism regarding the long-term effects of financial aid targeted at indebted 
individuals may be warranted.      22 
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Table 1: The Sample of Unique, First-Time Lottery Winners in Florida from May 1993 – December 2002  
Amount Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
<$1,000 8,494 15.08 5,670 14.56 4,888 13.93
$1,000 - $2,500 15,239 27.06 10,190 26.17 8,657 24.68
$2,500 - $5,000 413 0.73 295 0.76 274 0.78
$5,000 - $7,500 577 1.02 404 1.04 373 1.06
$7,500 - $10,000 728 1.29 513 1.32 476 1.36
$10,000 - $15,000 3,028 5.38 2,144 5.51 1,964 5.60
$15,000 - $20,000 5,682 10.09 4,038 10.37 3,760 10.72
$20,000 - $25,000 6,298 11.18 4,460 11.45 4,177 11.91
$25,000 - $30,000 5,418 9.62 3,836 9.85 3,610 10.29
$30,000 - $35,000 3,911 6.95 2,764 7.10 2,583 7.36
$35,000 - $40,000 2,183 3.88 1,582 4.06 1,499 4.27
$40,000 - $45,000 1,446 2.57 1,042 2.68 975 2.78
$45,000 - $50,000 802 1.42 574 1.47 539 1.54
$50,000 - $60,000 837 1.49 553 1.42 512 1.46
$60,000 - $70,000 393 0.70 287 0.74 271 0.77
$70,000 - $80,000 209 0.37 150 0.39 134 0.38
$80,000 - $90,000 124 0.22 77 0.20 69 0.20
$90,000 - $100,000 130 0.23 90 0.23 79 0.23
$100,000 - $150,000 248 0.44 167 0.43 147 0.42
Total 56,160 100 38,836 100 34,987 100






   25 
Table 2: Lottery Players Linked to Bankruptcy Petitions 
Amount Won No Bankruptcy Bankruptcy % Bankruptcy No Bankruptcy Bankruptcy % Bankruptcy No Bankruptcy Bankruptcy % Bankruptcy
<$1,000 4,742 146 2.99 4,767 121 2.48 4,621 267 5.46
$1,000 - $2,500 8,367 290 3.35 8,399 258 2.98 8,109 548 6.33
$2,500 - $5,000 264 10 3.65 264 10 3.65 254 20 7.30
$5,000 - $7,500 367 6 1.61 357 16 4.29 351 22 5.90
$7,500 - $10,000 467 9 1.89 462 14 2.94 453 23 4.83
$10,000 - $15,000 1,937 27 1.37 1,886 78 3.97 1,859 105 5.35
$15,000 - $20,000 3,705 55 1.46 3,628 132 3.51 3,573 187 4.97
$20,000 - $25,000 4,112 65 1.56 4,026 151 3.62 3,961 216 5.17
$25,000 - $30,000 3,554 56 1.55 3,474 136 3.77 3,418 192 5.32
$30,000 - $35,000 2,548 35 1.36 2,494 89 3.45 2,459 124 4.80
$35,000 - $40,000 1,476 23 1.53 1,433 66 4.40 1,410 89 5.94
$40,000 - $45,000 959 16 1.64 946 29 2.97 930 45 4.62
$45,000 - $50,000 532 7 1.30 514 25 4.64 507 32 5.94
$50,000 - $60,000 507 5 0.98 493 19 3.71 488 24 4.69
$60,000 - $70,000 269 2 0.74 255 16 5.90 253 18 6.64
$70,000 - $80,000 132 2 1.49 129 5 3.73 127 7 5.22
$80,000 - $90,000 69 0 0.00 66 3 4.35 66 3 4.35
$90,000 - $100,000 77 2 2.53 75 4 5.06 73 6 7.59
$100,000 - $150,000 146 1 0.68 142 5 3.40 141 6 4.08
Total 34,230 757 2.16 33,810 1,177 3.36 33,053 1,934 5.53
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Table 3: Falsification Test: The Effect of Later Winning the Lottery on Bankruptcy Rates 
1 2 3 4
Panel 1
Won $10,000 - $50,000 -0.0061*** -0.0011 -0.0028 -0.0006
(0.0015) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0036)
Won $50,000 - $150,000 0.0002 0.0037 0.0026 0.0041
(0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0046)
Panel 2
Won $10,000 - $50,000 -0.0134*** 0.0024 0.0043 0.0041
(0.0016) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.0039)
Won $50,000 - $150,000 -0.0123*** -0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0044) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0051)
Panel 3
Won $10,000 - $50,000 -0.0195*** 0.0013 0.0015 0.0035
(0.0022) (0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0052)
Won $50,000 - $150,000 -0.0121** 0.0024 0.0025 0.0039
(0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0068)
Number of Observations 34,987 34,987 34,987 34,987
No Yes No Yes
No No Yes Yes Includes year fixed effects?
Effects reported are relative to winning less than $10,000. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Bankruptcy Rate in the 2 Years prior to Winning
Bankruptcy Rate 3 to 5 Years prior to Winning
Bankruptcy Rate in the 5 Years prior to Winning
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Table 4: The Effect of Winning the Lottery on Bankruptcy Rates 
1 2 3 4
Panel 1
Won $10,000 - $50,000 -0.0166*** -0.0086** -0.0106*** -0.0087**
(0.0016) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0038)
Won $50,000 - $150,000 -0.0215*** -0.0160*** -0.0176*** -0.0163***
(0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0050)
Panel 2
Won $10,000 - $50,000 0.0084*** 0.0040 0.0081** 0.0050
(0.0020) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0047)
Won $50,000 - $150,000 0.0143*** 0.0113* 0.0143** 0.0121**
(0.0054) (0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0062)
Panel 3
Won $10,000 - $50,000 -0.0082*** -0.0046 -0.0025 -0.0036
(0.0025) (0.0059) (0.0051) (0.0060)
Won $50,000 - $150,000 -0.0072 -0.0047 -0.0034 -0.0042
(0.0068) (0.0078) (0.0075) (0.0078)
Number of Observations 34,987 34,987 34,987 34,987
No Yes No Yes
No No Yes Yes Includes year fixed effects?
Effects reported are relative to winning less than $10,000. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Bankruptcy Rate within 2 Years after Winning
Bankruptcy Rate 3 to 5 Years after Winning
Bankruptcy Rate within 5 Years after Winning












   28 
Table 5: Robustness Checks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel 1
Won $10,000 - $50,000 -0.0087** -0.0116* -0.0080** -0.0102** -0.0087** - -0.0087**
(0.0038) (0.0067) (0.0040)  (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0038)
Won $50,000 - $150,000 -0.0163*** -0.0184*** -0.0152*** -0.0172*** -0.016*** -0.0119* -0.0163***
(0.0050) (0.0064) (0.0044)   (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0068) (0.0050)
Panel 2
Won $10,000 - $50,000 0.0050 0.0117 0.0127*** 0.0083* 0.0045 - 0.0053
(0.0047) (0.0084) (0.0048)   (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0047)
Won $50,000 - $150,000 0.0121** 0.0171** 0.0187*** 0.0145** 0.0114 0.0192* 0.0122**
(0.0062) (0.0080) (0.0071)   (0.0068) (0.0071) (0.0101) (0.0062)
Panel 3
Won $10,000 - $50,000 -0.0036 0.0002 0.0046 -0.0019 -0.0041 - -0.0034
(0.0060) (0.0106) (0.0062) (0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0060)
Won $50,000 - $150,000 -0.0042 -0.0014 0.0035 -0.0027 -0.0048 0.0073 -0.0041
(0.0078) (0.0101) (0.0083) (0.0076) (0.0080) (0.0120) (0.0078)
<$10,000 <$2,500 <$1,000 <$10,000 <$10,000 4-of-5 number matchers <$10,000
Number of Observations 34,987 34,987 109,121 34,987 34,987 13,874 34,987
Each column controls for year fixed effects and the change in the structure of the Fantasy 5 game. Column (3) also includes game fixed effects. Estimates
reported in column (1) are the same as those reported in column (4) of Table 4. Column (7) includes a quadratic of the months exposed to the anticipation of
bankruptcy reform during March 1, 2005 through October 16, 2005 as well as a quadratic of the months exposed to the new bankruptcy law which took effect
on October 17, 2005. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.  
Controls for quadratic of the 
months of exposure to bankruptcy 
Lottery Game/Sample Fantasy 5 Fantasy 5 Fantasy 5
No




Bankruptcy Rate within 2 Years after Winning
Bankruptcy Rate 3 to 5 Years after Winning
Bankruptcy Rate within 5 Years after Winning
Excluded Group
Yes






Controls for the maximum prize 
and total payout from previous 
No No No
Fantasy 5
Fantasy 5 (after game 
change in July of 2001)
No No
No No
Controls for total payout from 
current drawing
Instruments for actual payout with 
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Table 6: Debts, Assets, Expenditures, and Income of Lottery Winners Who File for Bankruptcy 
Panel A: 0-5 Years Prior to Win
Income, Expenditures, and Real Estate
Large Winners Small Winners Diff Large Winners Small Winners Diff
N=20 N=52 N=20 N=52
Unsecured Debt ($) 44,717 50,921 -6,204 % Homeowner 75% 56% 19
Secured Debt ($) 63,556 66,972 -3,416 Equity in Real Estate ($) 20,771 31,209 -10,438
Total Debt ($) 108,274 117,893 -9,620 Market Value of Real Estate ($) 79,505 84,592 -5,087
Total Assets ($) 93,395 94,529 -1,133 Annual Household Income ($) 16,213 17,529 -1,316
Net Assets ($) -14,878 -23,364 8,486 Annual Expenditures ($) 23,519 23,955 -436
Panel B: 0-2 Years Post Win
Large Winners Small Winners Diff Large Winners Small Winners Diff
N=17 N=61 N=17 N=61
Unsecured Debt ($) 76,813 60,752 16,061 % Homeowner 76% 52% 24
Secured Debt ($) 131,708 63,487 68,220** Equity in Real Estate ($) 18,861 17,621 1,240
Total Debt ($) 208,521 124,239 84,282** Market Value of Real Estate ($) 145,425 73,170 72,255**
Total Assets ($) 164,406 93,971 70,434** Annual Household Income ($) 24,714 23,409 1,304
Net Assets ($) -44,115 -30,268 -13,847 Annual Expenditures ($) 35,124 31,122 4,002
Panel C: 3-5 Years Post Win
Large Winners Small Winners Diff Large Winners Small Winners Diff
N=36 N=44 N=36 N=44
Unsecured Debt ($) 40,273 55,230 -14,957 % Homeowner 53% 45% 8
Secured Debt ($) 74,938 73,113 1,825 Equity in Real Estate ($) 22,903 33,827 -10,924
Total Debt ($) 115,211 128,343 -13,132 Market Value of Real Estate ($) 62,367 95,261 -32,894
Total Assets ($) 113,571 114,303 -733 Annual Household Income ($) 17,395 20,510 -3,115
Net Assets ($) -1,641 -14,040 12,399 Annual Expenditures ($) 22,300 26,717 -4,417
Panel D: 0-5 Years Post Win
Large Winners Small Winners Diff Large Winners Small Winners Diff
N=53 N=105 N=53 N=105
Unsecured Debt ($) 51,993 58,438 6,445 % Homeowner 60% 50% 10
Secured Debt ($) 93,147 67,521 25,627 Equity in Real Estate ($) 21,582 24,412 -2,831
Total Debt ($) 145,141 125,959 19,182 Market Value of Real Estate ($) 89,521 82,427 7,093
Total Assets ($) 129,876 102,491 27,385 Annual Household Income ($) 19,742 22,194 -2,452
Net Assets ($) -15,265 -23,468 8,203 Annual Expenditures ($) 26,413 29,276 -2,863
Note: Each panel shows average characteristics of lottery winners who filed for personal bankruptcy.  Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
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Figure 1a: Flows into Bankruptcy Before and After Winning the Lottery 
 
Figure 1b: Flows into Bankruptcy Before and After Winning the Lottery (After Removing Year 
Fixed Effects) 
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Figure 2: Bankruptcy Rates in the First 2 Years after Winning the Lottery 
 
Figure 3: Bankruptcy Rates 3 to 5 Years After Winning the Lottery 
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